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An experimental study was conducted in a sample of America’s most successful entrepreneurs and one of comparable large company managers to examine three research questions: Why do some individuals choose riskier ventures than do others? Do managers and successful entrepreneurs perceive new venture risk and potential differently? What accounts for differences, if any, in their decision‐making behavior? The findings are equally interesting for the effects we found and did not find. We found that differences in risk propensity and in situational factors like the market competencies brought to a particular venture influence risky new venture decision‐making; that perceptions of new venture risk and potential differ between managers and successful entrepreneurs, though in a direction opposite to that we hypothesized; and that individual differences, rather than group‐level differences, are primarily responsible for the degree of risk taken by managers and successful entrepreneurs. Taken together, our results call for further research at the marketing/entrepreneurship interface and research into differences between managers and entrepreneurs, using samples of highly successful entrepreneurs and comparable managers in established firms.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

Well‐documented corporate demands for crossfunctionally competent employees have instigated a wide variety of efforts by the educational community to integrate business curricula. Many colleges and universities struggle to functionally integrate business programs that historically have been delivered by well‐defined, and often well‐siloed, disciplines. Drawing from the numerous published and unpublished case studies of cross‐functional integration attempts, this study develops a framework of critical issues to consider when developing an integrated program. The framework develops five major categories of issues (strategic, leadership, administrative, faculty, and student) to help universities identify typical program decisions and potential roadblocks that may inhibit the development of a successful program.

In spite of escalating efforts to curb abuse, fraud, and corruption in Congress, members of Congress persist in violating the norms, rules, and laws that aim to ensure they behave ethically. This chapter combines qualitative and quantitative analysis to describe congressional corruption in the modern era. Case studies illustrate consequential financial scandals while also differentiating four categories of corrupt financial practices.

Existing datasets on congressional scandals span the time period from 1972 to 2010, and this chapter extends the dataset to 2018. The analysis next uses the dataset to answer important questions empirically. Which types of scandals occur more often? Have these scandals grown more common or less common over time? What are the consequences of financial scandals for representatives' careers as public servants?

The market for mergers and takeovers, often referred to as the market for corporate control [Manne (1965)], has always attracted the attention of investors and researchers because takeovers represent corporate investment decisions on a scale several times larger than the normal, ongoing, growth‐maintaining capital outlays by the typical value‐maximising firm. Although the theoretical justifications for such corporate actions are reasonably well understood, the true motives for the mergers and the strategies adopted by acquiring firms to consummate them can be complex and diverse in scope. Corporate acquisitions can therefore have widespread effects on the wealth of various groups of agents involved in the market for corporate control.

The purpose of this paper is to review several major components of hostage negotiation including: the different types of hostage situations; the prediction of the behavioral patterns of the hostage taker; the collection and the use of police intelligence in hostage incidents; and the application of forensic psychology during the hostage negotiations process.

Emphasis on the social psychological aspects of creating attitude change and gaining compliance with the hostage taker are introduced to assist in developing an effective crisis communication approach during the hostage negotiations process.

The paper also discusses trends in hostage negotiation strategies within incidents of domestic violence, suicide by cop, school shootings, and suicide/homicide bombings.

Limitations and advancements in the field of hostage negotiations are also discussed as well as suggestions for the use of tactical entry to resolve unsuccessful hostage negotiations.

Explores the current trend of “suicide by cop,” but also introduces the concept of homicide by cop in relation to police shootings.

The use of criminal psychology in developing hostage negotiation strategies to engage hostage takers with personality disorders, PTSD, paranoid schizophrenia, and suicidal depression is also discussed.